Managed configuration lets enterprise admins set supported requirements and defaults for ChatGPT Work and Codex. Requirements constrain what users and tasks can do. Defaults provide starting values. Support depends on the product, client version, and execution environment.
For Work with local access and dots, supported Global policy governs the shared cloud orchestrator when managed policy is enabled; applicable local execution requirements govern the connected computer. Work cloud containers retain existing Work Cloud policies, and supported device controls still apply to local execution. Codex keeps its existing configuration behavior. Managed configuration does not grant a workspace seat or feature access. Use Roles and workspace permissions for those controls.
Enterprise admins can control supported local client behavior with:
-
Requirements: admin-enforced constraints that users can’t override.
-
Configuration defaults: system or cloud-managed
config.tomlsettings that users can override. -
Legacy managed defaults:
managed_config.tomlstarting values applied when a supported client launches. Users can still change settings during a run. The client reapplies these defaults the next time it starts.
See Agent Security for the Global baseline, environment overrides, and orchestrator and executor field lists.
Agent Security and Local computer access with Work Cloud
Use Agent Security in the Admin Console to manage policies and configuration. It replaces Policies & Configuration. Agent Security will be available to everyone, independently of Local computer access with Work Cloud. Existing policies, assignments, and ordering are preserved. Review your existing policies in Agent Security. Local computer access with Work Cloud is a separate opt-in. See Agent Security for migration guidance.
Before moving policy automation to Agent Security:
-
Identify affected integrations. Inventory Terraform configurations and scripts that update policies, and record which policies they manage.
-
Use the policy API to manage Global settings. To manage Local or Codex Cloud settings, use the Agent Security UI. Existing Global API workflows remain available after migration. Test your scripts and Terraform integrations, and confirm that policy assignments and ordering are unchanged.
-
Make any required changes and test the automation. Verify that an intended update reaches the correct Agent Security policy and that the resulting controls are enforced.
Policy migration does not grant local computer access for Work or dots. Reviewing or creating policies is recommended before rollout, but the confirmation flow does not require policy creation to enable access. Before enabling Allow local computer access, review the migrated baseline or create a cloud baseline if your policies are currently delivered only through MDM. If enforce_residency is enabled in any cloud policy, Allow local computer access is disabled for both Work and dots. This safeguard does not configure workspace residency or, by itself, disable Work Cloud or dots.
Environment overrides vary supported settings within a policy. Within a given policy, the order from highest to lowest is OS-specific environment override → all-OS environment override → Global. A higher-priority policy still wins over a lower-priority policy, even when the lower-priority policy is more specific. Some requirements have field-specific merge rules. Confirm which override editors and fields are available for your workspace.
When managed policy and remote hooks are enabled, Work Cloud with local access and dots use admin-managed remote MCP hooks on the cloud orchestrator. Configure mcp_tool handlers in Global requirements.toml. Work Cloud without local access and personal accounts do not use these enterprise hooks. Command/shell, prompt, and agent handlers; hooks from local configuration, plugins, or local directories; environment-scoped hooks; and SessionEnd MCP hooks are not supported with cloud orchestration, even when tools execute locally. When both orchestration and execution are local, existing supported hooks continue to work in local-only Work and Codex threads. Admins can still configure supported managed hooks in Agent Security for those workflows. Before relying on these hooks, test callback connectivity, required events, and failure behavior. An explicit supported denial can block an action, but a PreToolUse callback error, timeout, or malformed response can fail the hook without blocking the tool. MCP hooks do not provide a complete Compliance API audit trail. See the Configuration Reference.
Configure plugin marketplaces and defaults
Define local or Git marketplaces and plugin defaults in system config.toml
or the supported configuration defaults in Agent Security.
These settings are defaults, not enforced policy.
See Configuration Reference for configuration keys, Configuration precedence for overrides, and repo plugin settings for project-level configuration. Workspace GitHub import and sync is separate.
Admin-enforced requirements (requirements.toml)
Requirements constrain security-sensitive settings (approval policy, approvals reviewer, automatic review policy, sandbox mode, permission profiles, web search mode, managed hooks, which MCP servers users can enable, and which plugin marketplace sources they can use). When resolving configuration (for example from config.toml, profile files, or CLI config overrides), if a value conflicts with an enforced rule, the local client falls back to a compatible value and notifies the user. If you configure an mcp_servers allowlist, the client enables an MCP server only when both its name and identity match an approved entry; otherwise, the client disables it.
Requirements can also constrain feature flags via the [features] table in requirements.toml. Note that features aren’t always security-sensitive, but enterprises can pin values if desired. Omitted keys remain unconstrained.
For Codex 0.138.0 or later, prefer permission profiles
with allowed_permission_profiles and managed default_permissions. Use
allowed_sandbox_modes only for legacy deployments that still configure
sandbox_mode.
For the exact key list, see the requirements.toml section in Configuration Reference.
Migrate the retired untrusted approval policy
Codex and ChatGPT Work no longer support approval_policy = "untrusted".
Remove it from managed defaults, legacy managed_config.toml, and any user,
project, profile, or startup configuration that sets it.
For interactive, read-only use, select approval_policy = "on-request" with a
read-only sandbox or permission profile allowed by your managed requirements.
Commands allowed by that sandbox can run without approval.
To keep stricter command approvals, omit an explicit approval_policy, set
trust_level = "untrusted" in the project’s entry in user-level
~/.codex/config.toml, and keep untrusted in allowed_approval_policies.
This also disables project-local configuration. Setting on-request explicitly
overrides that policy. See
Migrate from the retired untrusted approval policy
for examples and security tradeoffs.
Locations and precedence
For local execution, requirements are applied from lower to higher priority as follows. This ordering also applies to local steps in Local computer access with Work Cloud:
- System
requirements.toml(/etc/codex/requirements.tomlon Unix systems, including Linux and macOS, or%ProgramData%\OpenAI\Codex\requirements.tomlon Windows). - Agent Security requirements delivered in the cloud config bundle.
- Legacy
managed_config.tomlfields that the local client reinterprets as requirements. - macOS managed preferences (MDM) delivered through
com.openai.codex:requirements_toml_base64.
Higher-precedence layers override ordinary scalar and list values from lower
layers. Tables merge by key, while requirements such as rules, hooks, and
filesystem restrictions have field-specific composition behavior. Use the
requirements.toml reference
for the current schema instead of assuming that every field merges the same
way.
For backward compatibility, supported local clients reinterpret the legacy
approval_policy, approvals_reviewer, and sandbox_mode fields as
requirements. This conversion adds compatibility choices where necessary; use
requirements.toml for explicit allowlists.
Precedence for Local computer access with Work Cloud
For Work with local access and dots, distinguish Global orchestrator policy from execution policy. Applicable local requirements govern the connected computer. Work cloud containers and dots cloud computers use their own execution configuration and requirements, rather than the managed environment bundle used by other executors.
For local execution, MDM and legacy managed-device requirements rank above Agent Security. The device’s system requirements file ranks below Agent Security. Within each policy, resolve OS-specific environment overrides before all-OS environment overrides, then Global. Policy priority wins over specificity across policies.
| Control | Local Work without sync and local Codex | Local computer access with Work Cloud |
|---|---|---|
| Enterprise requirements | Follow the local requirements order above. | Apply to local executors. Work cloud containers retain existing Work Cloud policies. |
| Device execution restrictions | Enforced by supported local controls. | Follow the local requirements order above, including MDM and legacy requirements above Agent Security. |
| Environment overrides | Use the configuration model for the relevant product. | Within one policy: OS-specific environment override, then all-OS environment override, then Global. A lower-priority policy cannot win through specificity. |
Requirements impose constraints, while configuration defaults supply starting values. For Work with local access and dots, supported Global policy applies through the shared cloud orchestrator when managed policy is enabled. Applicable local requirements.toml requirements govern execution on a connected computer. Work cloud containers and dots cloud computers use their own execution configuration and requirements, rather than the managed environment bundle used by other executor types. Local execution restrictions do not automatically apply to these cloud computers. Review cloud capability permissions and test local and cloud execution separately.
Keep orchestrator controls, including approvals and web search, in Global. Use the dedicated Allowed approval policies and Allowed web search modes controls where available, and TOML for other supported fields. See the Configuration Reference for the field list and execution scope.
Network policy precedence and runtime limits
Within a given policy, the order from highest to lowest is OS-specific environment override → all-OS environment override → Global. A higher-priority policy still wins over a lower-priority policy, even when the lower-priority policy is more specific. Some requirements have field-specific merge rules. The runtime then enforces the resolved requirements. Consider the field-specific network cases below separately from policy priority.
These examples compare environment and Global settings within the same policy, with managed networking already configured and no higher-priority policy changing the values. They describe field-specific merge and runtime behavior.
Set different domain access by environment
For the same domain rule within a policy, an admin environment override can allow a domain denied in Global or deny a domain allowed in Global. Without an environment override, the Global rule is inherited. Other effective Deny rules or access controls can still block a request.
How domain rules combine
| Global rule | Environment rule | Domain-policy result |
|---|---|---|
| Deny | Allow | Allowed by the environment override, subject to the conditions below. |
| Allow | Deny | Blocked in that environment. |
| Allow | Allow | Allowed by these domain rules. |
| Deny | Deny | Blocked by these domain rules. |
| Allow or Deny | No override | Inherits the Global rule. |
These outcomes compare the same domain key within one policy, with no higher-priority policy changing the result. A higher-priority value replaces the same key. Other inherited keys remain. An Allow does not bypass a different matching Deny, such as an inherited wildcard. An empty environment map does not clear inherited rules.
Example: Deny packages.example.com in Global and allow it in Development. Development can permit it under the conditions above. Production inherits the Global Deny unless overridden.
Confirm the deployed executor supports these merge rules. Coverage for regular managed executors still needs validation.
Orchestrator limits. Managed HTTP/SOCKS listener ports and non-loopback proxy listeners are unsupported by the cloud runtime; socket-rule support depends on the execution path. A local-execution setting in the table below is not a supported Orchestrator configuration.
Other network runtime limits
All field names below are under experimental_network in requirements.toml. The arrows show a Global value followed by an environment value within the same policy. These local-execution cases do not establish Orchestrator support for the same settings.
| Setting and attempted override | Runtime behavior | Admin action |
|---|---|---|
| domains: deny → allow | The environment Allow replaces the same Global domain key on supported paths. Other matching Deny rules still apply. | Test both allowed and blocked requests on the deployed executor. |
managed_allowed_domains_only: true → false |
Do not infer exclusivity behavior from domain-key composition. With effective enabled = true and managed_allowed_domains_only = true, ordinary commands need effective Allow entries. |
Review effective settings and inherited Allow entries. A deny-only policy does not allow the rest of the internet. |
allow_local_binding: false → true |
On the supported Codex Cloud proxy path, an explicit false can prevent upstream-proxy access. A supported higher-priority Cloud override can change it. | Check the source of the effective value and executor support. Do not apply the Cloud default to Local. |
Proxy activation, exclusivity, upstream-proxy behavior, and Unix-socket rules have executor-specific behavior. Do not generalize domain-key composition to these settings. Verify the effective values and test the deployed runtime. For Codex Cloud local/private connectivity, see Configure network access requirements.
Verify behavior before rollout
Test the actual destinations, local listeners, proxy behavior, and socket paths your workflows use. Check an action that should succeed and one that should be blocked in each affected environment. Check that the deployed runtime version supports each setting you use.
Cloud-managed requirements
When a user signs in with ChatGPT on a supported plan, supported local clients
can receive admin-enforced requirements associated with the workspace. This is
a delivery channel for requirements.toml-compatible policy. It doesn’t grant
workspace access or replace workspace RBAC. Authentication requirements must be
managed locally.
Open Agent Security in the Admin Console to review and manage cloud requirements. Use the migrated global baseline for existing policies. For example, this policy limits approval and sandbox choices and prompts before a supported shell entry point runs:
allowed_approval_policies = ["on-request"]
allowed_sandbox_modes = ["read-only", "workspace-write"]
[rules]
prefix_rules = [
{ pattern = [{ any_of = ["bash", "sh", "zsh"] }], decision = "prompt", justification = "Require explicit approval for shell entry points" },
]
Check that every managed client version supports the keys you select. Assign the policy to the intended users or groups and verify that it takes effect on their supported clients. Use the configuration reference for the current schema and the administration surface for current assignment behavior.
The service selects the enterprise-managed requirement layers that apply to the signed-in identity. The local client evaluates those layers with the other requirements sources described in Locations and precedence. Use the current administration surface for workspace-side creation and assignment. Don’t rely on a copied group-matching algorithm; the administration service owns that behavior and can change it independently of the local requirements format.
For supported keys and examples, see
Example requirements.toml and the
requirements.toml reference.
How local clients apply cloud-managed requirements
The local loading and cache behavior below describes supported local clients. It does not establish when a changed cloud policy takes effect in an already-running task using Local computer access with Work Cloud. Verify the effective policy before relying on a changed restriction.
When a user starts a supported local client and signs in with ChatGPT on a supported plan, the client first checks for a valid, identity-matched cache entry. If no valid entry is available, the client fetches the applicable bundle with retries and writes a signed cache entry on success. If the request fails or times out and no valid cache is available, the cloud config bundle load returns an error rather than silently starting without the cloud-managed requirements layer.
After cache resolution, the client composes the cloud requirements with the other requirements layers described above. A background refresh can update the cache for a later start; it doesn’t replace the requirements already loaded into the current process.
Confirm the admin and employee experience
Assign a person to own each managed policy, record which users or groups should receive it, and document the business reason for any filesystem, network, approval, or permission-profile restriction.
Test an allowed workflow and a blocked workflow with a user who has the intended permissions. Check the effective settings in the supported client. A workspace role or group alone does not enforce a local runtime restriction.
Manage authentication locally
Set allowed_login_methods, allowed_chatgpt_workspaces,
cli_auth_credentials_store, and chatgpt_base_url in the local system
requirements.toml or macOS MDM requirements. Codex ignores these four fields
in cloud-managed requirements. Local authentication requirements apply before
credentials load and before Codex retrieves cloud policy.
To require ChatGPT login to an approved workspace and store credentials in the OS credential store, use:
allowed_login_methods = ["chatgpt"]
allowed_chatgpt_workspaces = ["00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"]
cli_auth_credentials_store = "keyring"
allowed_login_methods accepts chatgpt, api, or both. If omitted, this setting
doesn’t restrict login methods. If set, the list must contain at least one method.
api permits API authentication, including Amazon Bedrock.
The workspace restriction also applies to
Codex access tokens.
User-configured forced_login_method and forced_chatgpt_workspace_id must
follow the requirements. When a user selects a workspace, it must also appear
in the managed workspace allowlist. If no workspaces match, ChatGPT login is
unavailable. API authentication remains available when permitted. If no login method
is available, Codex refuses to start.
See the requirements reference for credential storage modes and service URL configuration.
Example requirements.toml
This example blocks --ask-for-approval never and --sandbox danger-full-access (including --yolo):
allowed_approval_policies = ["untrusted", "on-request"]
allowed_sandbox_modes = ["read-only", "workspace-write"]
Here, untrusted preserves the stricter approval behavior derived from
trust_level = "untrusted"; it does not make approval_policy = "untrusted" a
supported explicit setting.
Disable Appshots
To disable Appshots for managed users, set the top-level allow_appshots requirement:
allow_appshots = false
Where Appshots are available, allow_appshots = false disables them. If you
omit the key, requirements don’t constrain Appshots, and normal product
availability checks apply. App-server clients that read effective requirements
through configRequirements/read receive the same restriction as
allowAppshots; an omitted or null allowAppshots value doesn’t disable
Appshots.
Disable device remote control
To disable device remote control
for managed users, set the top-level allow_remote_control requirement:
allow_remote_control = false
Where device remote control is supported, allow_remote_control = false
disables it. If you omit the key, requirements don’t constrain device remote
control, and normal product availability checks apply. This requirement doesn’t
disable SSH remote connections.
Control available permission profiles
Use allowed_permission_profiles to control which built-in and custom
permission profiles users can select. This is the
permission-profile counterpart to allowed_sandbox_modes; use the allowlist that
matches how your users select permissions.
Permission-profile allowlists require Codex 0.138.0 or later. Codex 0.137.0 and
earlier ignore allowed_permission_profiles and managed
default_permissions.
Use the permission-profile examples below only after every managed client runs a supporting release. Don’t deploy managed custom profiles until the fleet upgrade is complete.
When present, the table is the complete list of allowed profiles. It allows
profiles set to true and denies profiles omitted or set to false, including
built-ins added in future Codex versions.
Allow the standard profiles
This policy allows read-only and workspace access, but not full access:
default_permissions = ":workspace"
[allowed_permission_profiles]
":read-only" = true
":workspace" = true
# ":danger-full-access" is omitted, so it is denied.
Add a managed least-privilege default
Admins can define a custom profile in the same requirements source. Use
organization-specific profile names that won’t collide with names in users’
loaded config. Custom names can’t start with : or use the reserved filesystem
name.
Don’t deploy managed custom profiles to clients running Codex 0.137.0 or earlier. Those clients recognize the profile table but not the managed default that selects it.
For example:
default_permissions = "acme_review_only"
[allowed_permission_profiles]
":read-only" = true
":workspace" = true
acme_review_only = true
# ":danger-full-access" is intentionally omitted, so it is denied.
[permissions.acme_review_only]
description = "Review code without modifying the workspace."
extends = ":read-only"
Allow only enterprise-defined profiles
Omit all built-ins when users should select only admin-defined profiles:
default_permissions = "acme_workspace"
[allowed_permission_profiles]
acme_workspace = true
[permissions.acme_workspace]
description = "Workspace access with sensitive files denied."
extends = ":workspace"
[permissions.acme_workspace.filesystem]
glob_scan_max_depth = 3
[permissions.acme_workspace.filesystem.":workspace_roots"]
"**/*.env" = "deny"
The custom profile can extend :workspace even though users can’t select the
built-in :workspace profile directly.
Turn off a profile allowed by another source
Permission allowlists combine by profile name. Because cloud requirements have
higher precedence than system requirements, cloud requirements can use false
to turn off a profile allowed by the system file.
Cloud requirements:
default_permissions = ":read-only"
[allowed_permission_profiles]
":read-only" = true
":workspace" = false
System requirements:
[allowed_permission_profiles]
":read-only" = true
":workspace" = true # Not honored because cloud requirements set this to false.
Set default_permissions explicitly to an allowed profile. If it’s omitted,
the local runtime defaults to :workspace only when both :workspace and
:read-only are explicitly allowed. When allowed_permission_profiles is
absent, managed requirements don’t restrict which profile names users can
select. Every entry must name a built-in profile or a custom profile defined in
a loaded config or requirements source. Define custom profiles in managed
requirements to control their behavior centrally.
Override sandbox requirements by host
Use [[remote_sandbox_config]] when one managed policy should apply different
sandbox requirements on different hosts. For example, you can keep a stricter
default for laptops while allowing workspace writes on matching dev boxes or CI
runners. Host-specific entries currently override allowed_sandbox_modes only:
allowed_sandbox_modes = ["read-only"]
[[remote_sandbox_config]]
hostname_patterns = ["*.devbox.example.com", "runner-??.ci.example.com"]
allowed_sandbox_modes = ["read-only", "workspace-write"]
The local runtime compares each hostname_patterns entry against the
best-effort resolved host name. It prefers the fully qualified domain name when
available and falls back to the local host name. Matching is case-insensitive;
* matches any sequence of characters, and ? matches one character.
The first matching [[remote_sandbox_config]] entry wins within the same
requirements source. If no entry matches, the local runtime keeps the top-level
allowed_sandbox_modes. Host name matching is for policy selection only; don’t
treat it as authenticated device proof.
You can also constrain web search mode:
allowed_web_search_modes = ["cached"] # "disabled" remains implicitly allowed
allowed_web_search_modes = [] allows only "disabled".
For example, allowed_web_search_modes = ["cached"] prevents live web search even in danger-full-access sessions.
Configure network access requirements
[experimental_network] is experimental and may change. Do not enable these
requirements broadly across an enterprise deployment without validating them
on the local client versions and operating systems your users run. Windows
support is still limited; avoid applying this policy to Windows users unless
you have tested it in your environment.
Use [experimental_network] in requirements.toml when administrators should
define network access requirements centrally. These requirements are separate
from the user features.network_proxy toggle: they can configure sandbox
networking without that feature flag, but they don’t grant command network
access when the active sandbox keeps networking off. Set
experimental_network.enabled = true to activate the managed proxy; domain
rules alone do not make the proxy active.
[experimental_network]
enabled = true
managed_allowed_domains_only = true
[experimental_network.domains]
"api.openai.com" = "allow"
"**.example.com" = "allow"
"blocked.example.com" = "deny"
"**.exfil.example.com" = "deny"
Use experimental_network.managed_allowed_domains_only = true only when you
also define administrator-owned "allow" entries in
[experimental_network.domains] and want those rules to be exclusive. If it’s
true without managed allow rules, user-added domain allow rules don’t remain
effective. Do not combine the canonical domains map with the legacy
allowed_domains or denied_domains lists.
*.example.com matches subdomains only. **.example.com matches the apex
domain and its subdomains. A matching deny rule wins over an allow rule.
The domain syntax, local/private destination rules, deny-over-allow behavior, and DNS rebinding limitations are the same as the sandbox networking behavior described in Agent approvals & security.
The proxy routes local commands that run inside the sandbox. Browser tools also check managed network denies and exclusive allowlists before accessing an origin. This is a separate policy check, not routing browser traffic through the command proxy. It doesn’t filter web search, apps and connectors, MCP servers, native-app traffic, Codex service requests, or other capability-specific traffic. Use the controls for each surface:
- Use
allowed_web_search_modesto restrict web search. - Use
features.apps = falseto disable app and connector integrations, andfeatures.plugins = falseto disable plugins where supported. - Use the managed
mcp_serversapproved list to restrict MCP servers. - Use feature requirements such as
browser_use,in_app_browser, andcomputer_useto restrict browser and computer-use capabilities. - For supported managed Codex Cloud commands, configure Agent Security requirements and the Cloud environment internet settings separately.
A command domain allowlist does not replace these capability-specific controls.
On supported managed Codex Cloud execution paths, Agent Security requirements constrain command networking. Codex Cloud environment internet settings apply separately. An allowed domain in Agent Security does not override a restriction in the Cloud environment’s internet settings. These command-network controls do not, by themselves, disable hosted web search, apps, or MCP. ChatGPT Work Cloud has separate capability permissions and does not inherit these Agent Security requirements.
A managed command allowlist applies to commands using the managed proxy. Where policy permits full sandbox escalation and it is approved, that execution can bypass the command proxy. A narrow network grant is different from full sandbox escalation. Configure enforced approval and sandbox requirements for the intended boundary, and test both ordinary and escalated commands.
No effective allowed destinations: When Manage Networking and Only allow domains added by admins are On, ordinary managed commands need effective allowed destinations. If no Allow entries are configured or inherited, those commands have no allowed destinations. A deny-only policy does not implicitly allow the rest of the internet. Add required Allow entries and check inherited rules before saving. This restriction applies to the managed command proxy, not every tool or approved full sandbox escalation.
Codex Cloud local/private connectivity: An explicit Off value for local/private connectivity can prevent Codex Cloud from reaching its upstream proxy, even when the destination domain is allowed. Check the final
allow_local_bindingvalue and identify which policy or setting supplies it. On the supported Cloud proxy path, this defaults to true only when no applicable requirement, selected network profile, or proxy feature setting supplies a value. An inherited false still counts as an explicit setting. Where supported, set a higher-priority Cloud override to change this value for Codex Cloud without changing the Global value used by Local. This does not add domain Allow entries. Verify executor support before relying on the override. Do not apply this Cloud default to Local.
Empty environment requirements inherit Global. Manage Networking Off is not the Cloud environment Internet access Off switch. See Configure networking in the UI.
Control browser and Computer Use
Use the [browser_use] and [computer_use] tables in requirements.toml to
restrict supported desktop clients. Validate the policy on the client versions
and operating systems in your deployment. A configured allow rule doesn’t
install a plugin, grant an operating-system permission, or approve an action
that still requires review.
For browser access, configure an origin policy. An origin includes the scheme,
host, and optional port, such as https://example.com or
https://*.example.com:8443. Don’t include a path, query, or fragment. Unlike
command-network domain rules, browser origin rules distinguish HTTP from HTTPS
and match the port.
This example restricts browser access to an approved site and prevents uploads and full Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) access there:
[browser_use]
allow_history_access = false
allow_global_persistent_approval = false
[browser_use.default_origin_policy]
access = "deny"
[browser_use.origins."https://example.com"]
access = "allow"
uploads = "deny"
downloads = "allow"
full_cdp_access = "deny"
persistent_approval = false
access_approval_lifetime = "turn"
Matching origin rules are resolved per field. A matching deny wins. Otherwise, the default origin policy supplies fields that matching rules don’t specify. Local configuration can add restrictions but can’t relax a managed deny. Network denies and exclusive managed network allowlists still apply.
Set browser_use.disable_auto_review = true to disable automatic approval
review for browser actions, or set auto_review = "deny" on an origin policy
to restrict it for that origin. This controls approval handling; it doesn’t
disable model safety monitoring.
For native apps, set a default access policy and identify permitted apps. For example, this macOS policy allows Calculator and prevents saved approvals:
[computer_use]
default_app_access = "deny"
allow_persistent_approval = false
[computer_use.macos.bundle_ids]
"com.apple.calculator" = "allow"
Windows policies can identify packaged apps with
computer_use.windows.aumids or executables with
computer_use.windows.exes. Executable rules require publisher_name,
product_name, and access; binary_name is optional. Use the app’s verified
identity rather than its display name alone.
See the configuration reference for the complete fields and locked-use restrictions for managed macOS devices.
Pin feature flags
You can also pin feature flags for users
receiving a managed requirements.toml:
[features]
personality = true
unified_exec = false
# Disable surface-specific features when needed.
browser_use = false
browser_use_full_cdp_access = false
browser_use_external = false
in_app_browser = false
in_app_updates = false
computer_use = false
Use the canonical feature keys from config.toml’s [features] table for
runtime features. The local runtime normalizes recognized features to meet these
pins and rejects conflicting writes to config.toml or profile file feature
settings.
in_app_browser = falsedisables the built-in browser pane.in_app_updates = falsedisables the ChatGPT desktop app’s own updater on restart, where supported. It doesn’t affect external package deployment or extend support for older app versions. For setup and rollout guidance, see Manage app updates.browser_use = falsedisables Computer Use in browsers and Browser Agent availability.browser_use_full_cdp_access = falsedisables full CDP access in the local runtime, including Browser Developer mode, and prevents the ChatGPT desktop app from enabling the corresponding setting.browser_use_external = falsedisables external Browser Use.computer_use = falsedisables Computer Use, Record & Replay, and related install or setup flows.
If you omit these keys, policy allows the features, subject to normal client, platform, and rollout availability.
Restrict locked computer use
To prevent users from enabling Locked Use on a managed Mac, add this requirement:
[computer_use]
allow_locked_computer_use = false
This requirement removes the controls for enabling Locked Use. It doesn’t turn off Locked Use if it’s already enabled. If you omit it, normal product availability and the user’s local setting still apply.
Configure automatic review policy
Use allowed_approvals_reviewers to require or allow automatic review. Set it
to ["auto_review"] to require automatic review, or include "user" when users
can choose manual approval.
Set guardian_policy_config to replace the tenant-specific section of the
automatic review policy. The local runtime still uses the built-in reviewer
template and output contract. Managed guardian_policy_config takes precedence
over local [auto_review].policy.
allowed_approval_policies = ["on-request"]
allowed_approvals_reviewers = ["auto_review"]
guardian_policy_config = """
## Environment Profile
- Trusted internal destinations include github.com/my-org, artifacts.example.com,
and internal CI systems.
## Tenant Risk Taxonomy and Allow/Deny Rules
- Treat uploads to unapproved third-party file-sharing services as high risk.
- Deny actions that expose credentials or private source code to untrusted
destinations.
"""
Enforce deny-read requirements
Admins can deny reads for exact paths or glob patterns with
[permissions.filesystem]. Users can’t weaken these requirements with local
configuration.
[permissions.filesystem]
deny_read = [
# values can be absolute paths...
"/**/*.env",
# ...or relative to $HOME/%USERPROFILE% using `~`.
"~/.ssh",
# But relative paths starting with `./` are not allowed.
]
When deny-read requirements are present, the local runtime rejects full-access
permissions and keeps local execution in a read-only or workspace sandbox so it
can enforce them. On native Windows, managed deny_read applies to direct file
tools; shell subprocess reads don’t use this sandbox rule.
Enforce managed hooks from requirements
When managed policy and remote hooks are enabled, Work Cloud with local access and dots use admin-managed remote MCP hooks on the cloud orchestrator. Configure mcp_tool handlers in Global requirements.toml. Work Cloud without local access and personal accounts do not use these enterprise hooks. Command/shell, prompt, and agent handlers; hooks from local configuration, plugins, or local directories; environment-scoped hooks; and SessionEnd MCP hooks are not supported with cloud orchestration, even when tools execute locally. When both orchestration and execution are local, existing supported hooks continue to work in local-only Work and Codex threads. Admins can still configure supported managed hooks in Agent Security for those workflows.
Before relying on these hooks, test callback connectivity, required events, and failure behavior. An explicit supported denial can block an action, but a PreToolUse callback error, timeout, or malformed response can fail the hook without blocking the tool. MCP hooks do not provide a complete Compliance API audit trail. The following script and directory examples retain their Codex scope.
Admins can also define managed lifecycle hooks directly in requirements.toml.
Use [hooks] for the hook configuration itself, and point managed_dir at the
directory where your MDM or endpoint-management tooling installs the referenced
scripts.
To enforce managed hooks even for users who turned hooks off locally, pin
[features].hooks = true alongside [hooks]. To skip user, project, session,
and plugin hooks while still allowing managed hooks, set
allow_managed_hooks_only = true.
allow_managed_hooks_only = true
[features]
hooks = true
[hooks]
managed_dir = "/enterprise/hooks"
windows_managed_dir = 'C:\enterprise\hooks'
[[hooks.PreToolUse]]
matcher = "^Bash$"
[[hooks.PreToolUse.hooks]]
type = "command"
command = "python3 /enterprise/hooks/pre_tool_use_policy.py"
command_windows = 'py -3 C:\enterprise\hooks\pre_tool_use_policy.py'
timeout = 30
statusMessage = "Checking managed Bash command"
Notes:
- The local runtime enforces the hook configuration from
requirements.toml, but it doesn’t distribute the scripts inmanaged_dir. - Deliver those scripts with your MDM or device-management solution.
- Managed hook commands should reference absolute script paths under the configured managed directory.
allow_managed_hooks_only = trueskips hooks from user, project, session, and plugin sources, but still loads hooks fromrequirements.tomland other managed config layers.
Enforce command rules from requirements
Admins can also enforce restrictive command rules from requirements.toml
using a [rules] table. These rules merge with regular .rules files, and the
most restrictive decision still wins.
Unlike .rules, requirements rules must specify decision, and that decision
must be "prompt" or "forbidden" (not "allow").
[rules]
prefix_rules = [
{ pattern = [{ token = "rm" }], decision = "forbidden", justification = "Use git clean -fd instead." },
{ pattern = [{ token = "git" }, { any_of = ["push", "commit"] }], decision = "prompt", justification = "Require review before mutating history." },
]
To restrict which MCP servers a local client can enable, add an mcp_servers
approved list. For stdio servers, match on command; for streamable HTTP
servers, match on url:
[mcp_servers.docs]
identity = { command = "codex-mcp" }
[mcp_servers.remote]
identity = { url = "https://example.com/mcp" }
The string form of identity.command matches only the configured command. It
doesn’t inspect args, cwd, env, or env_vars.
To constrain a complete stdio invocation, match the executable and each positional argument:
[mcp_servers.internal.identity]
command = { executable = "/usr/local/bin/codex-mcp", args = [
{ match = "exact", value = "serve" },
{ match = "prefix", value = "--workspace=" },
] }
The executable, argument count, and argument order must match. Argument and URL
rules support exact, prefix, and full-value regex matching. Structured
command rules still don’t inspect cwd, env, or env_vars. Plugin-bundled
MCP servers use the same identity shapes under
plugins.<plugin>.mcp_servers.<server>.
If mcp_servers is present but empty, the local client disables all MCP servers.
Control plugin availability
To turn off plugins in supported local clients, set features.plugins to
false in requirements.toml:
features.plugins = false
This setting also applies when users sign in to Codex with an API key. See the
features.plugins
reference for the
supported configuration.
Restrict plugin marketplace sources
To restrict plugin marketplace sources, set
restrict_to_allowed_sources = true and define one or more source rules:
[marketplaces]
restrict_to_allowed_sources = true
[marketplaces.allowed_sources.company_plugins]
source = "git"
url = "https://github.com/example/company-plugins.git"
ref = "main"
[marketplaces.allowed_sources.internal_git]
source = "host_pattern"
host_pattern = '^git\.example\.com$'
[marketplaces.allowed_sources.local_plugins]
source = "local"
path = "/opt/company/codex-plugins"
Git rules match the normalized repository URL and, when present, an exact
ref. Host patterns are regular expressions matched against the lowercase Git
host; use ^ and $ for a whole-host match. Local rules require an absolute,
normalized path. See the requirements.toml reference
for the full schema and merge behavior.
These requirements reject unmatched marketplace add, plugin install, and configured Git marketplace refresh operations. They also filter configured marketplaces and their plugins at runtime.
The OpenAI-curated Git marketplaces, including the API-key catalog, must also
match the source allowlist. To allow them, include the following Git source
without a ref constraint:
[marketplaces.allowed_sources.openai_curated]
source = "git"
url = "https://github.com/openai/plugins.git"
To exclude the curated catalogs, omit that source and ensure no broader host rule allows it. Bundled plugins and remotely installed workspace plugins are separate from this curated Git source policy.
These source restrictions apply only where a local client supports plugin marketplace operations: ChatGPT and Codex in the desktop app, and Codex CLI. They don’t control plugin use in ChatGPT on the web or mobile, and they don’t add plugins to the IDE extension.
Managed defaults (managed_config.toml)
Managed defaults set the configuration a supported local client starts with. At
startup, they override the user’s local config.toml and any CLI --config
overrides. Users can still change those settings during the current run, and the
defaults apply again the next time the client starts.
If a managed default, macOS MDM profile, or saved configuration pins
gpt-5.5 for Codex users signed in with ChatGPT, replace it with an available
model before October 14, 2026. Choose gpt-6-sol once an administrator has
enabled it for the affected users. GPT-5.5 retires from ChatGPT,
ChatGPT Work, and Codex on all plans on that date. The OpenAI API isn’t
affected. See workspace model availability.
For configurations that still pin gpt-5.4 or gpt-5.4-mini, follow the
GPT-5.4 migration guidance.
Make sure your managed defaults meet your requirements; the local runtime rejects disallowed values.
Precedence and layering
The local runtime assembles the effective configuration in this order (top overrides bottom):
- Managed preferences (macOS MDM; highest precedence)
managed_config.toml(system/managed file)config.toml(user’s base configuration)
CLI --config key=value overrides apply to the base, but managed layers override them. This means each run starts from the managed defaults even if you provide local flags.
Cloud config.toml uses normal configuration precedence,
not the legacy ordering above. Cloud requirements.toml uses
requirements precedence.
Locations
- Linux/macOS (Unix):
/etc/codex/managed_config.toml - Windows/non-Unix:
~/.codex/managed_config.toml
If the file is missing, the local runtime skips the managed layer.
macOS managed preferences (MDM)
On macOS, admins can push a device profile that provides base64-encoded TOML payloads at:
- Preference domain:
com.openai.codex - Keys:
config_toml_base64(managed defaults)requirements_toml_base64(requirements)
The local runtime parses these “managed preferences” payloads as TOML. For
managed defaults (config_toml_base64), managed preferences have the highest
precedence. For requirements (requirements_toml_base64), precedence follows
the cloud-managed requirements order described above. The same
requirements-side [features] table works in requirements_toml_base64; use
canonical feature keys there as well.
MDM setup workflow
The local runtime honors standard macOS MDM payloads, so you can distribute
settings with tooling like Jamf Pro, Fleet, or Kandji. A lightweight
deployment looks like:
- Build the managed payload TOML and encode it with
base64(no wrapping). - Drop the string into your MDM profile under the
com.openai.codexdomain atconfig_toml_base64(managed defaults) orrequirements_toml_base64(requirements). - Push the profile, then ask users to restart the supported local client and confirm the startup config summary reflects the managed values.
- When revoking or changing policy, update the managed payload; the client reads the refreshed preference the next time it launches.
Avoid embedding secrets or high-churn dynamic values in the payload. Treat the managed TOML like any other MDM setting under change control.
Example managed_config.toml
# Set conservative defaults
approval_policy = "on-request"
sandbox_mode = "workspace-write"
[sandbox_workspace_write]
network_access = false # keep network disabled unless explicitly allowed
[otel]
environment = "prod"
exporter = "otlp-http" # point at your collector
log_user_prompt = false # keep prompts redacted
# exporter details live under exporter tables; see Monitoring and telemetry above
Recommended guardrails
- Prefer
workspace-writewith approvals for most users; reserve full access for controlled containers. - Keep
network_access = falseunless your security review allows a collector or domains required by your workflows. - Use managed configuration to pin OTel settings (exporter, environment), but keep
log_user_prompt = falseunless your policy explicitly allows storing prompt contents. - Periodically audit diffs between local
config.tomland managed policy to catch drift; managed layers should win over local flags and files.