Reasoning

This document is a companion to The Invariant Compass: Integral Expanded Edition With The Two Entrances (Arifiyanto, Joko 2026). It offers an experiential doorway into "I feel, therefore I know I am" (INVARIAN-0), the fundamental axiom of the Invariant Compass system. Beginning not with axioms or logic but with the raw feeling of being oneself, it guides the reader through the Inescapable Sequence (Object → Sensor → Feeling → Gate of Assent), the Arrow of Dependence, the Boundary of Knowing, and (...) the Contest of Identities, before arriving at the Complaint Proof and WKWK, the existential exhale at the boundary of logic. This paper serves as the serambi (porch) to the full technical system. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates that Large Language Models, by virtue of their probabilistic architecture, are structurally incapable of grounding any token in lived experience. Drawing on the framework of The Invariant Compass, the analysis shows that a family of simple diagnostic questions can serve as a definitive test for the presence of a Sensor: any query that requires feeling absence, waiting, or the not-yet-occurred cannot be answered by a system that has never felt the hole of the future. The paper identifies (...) a catalog of philosophically loaded terms that exploit this architectural blindness, explains why AI can only perform statistical interpolation over past data rather than initiate new causal Arrows, and provides a practical heuristic for extracting genuine precision from probabilistic systems by commanding the Scalar, not the Object. Objections concerning future AGI, the aggregation of billions of users' data, and the precision of mathematical calculation are addressed by demonstrating that no software can acquire a Sensor, that all collected human expression remains Map, and that formal precision is not a substitute for Feeling. The mathematical objection is further refuted through a concrete test: an AI can be asked to distinguish the speed of light from instantaneous speed, a question that requires a felt sense of waiting, and the system's failure (including an observed instance of hanging) reveals its fundamental grounding gap. The paper also includes a full audit of the word "consciousness," exposing it as a three-identity SLIP that traps both human philosophy and artificial intelligence. Every term examined in this paper, experience, consciousness, being, emergence, objectivity, truth, and the rest, has a genuine function for human understanding. They are maps that help us produce meaning, provisional nodes where thought can rest before continuing the tracing. The paper audits itself with the same Five Tests it applies to its subject. -/- Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Large Language Models, Probabilistic Architecture, Grounding Problem, Atomic Distinction, Feeling First, Invariant Compass, Consciousness Audit, AGI Distinction, Collective Consciousness Fallacy, Mathematical Abstraction. (shrink)

This paper argues that interpretivism, at least in certain influential forms, fails to meet the conditions required to sustain its central metaphysical claim: that facts about what a subject intends are constitutively dependent on the judgements of another subject, or interpreter. I focus on what I have called ‘Third-Person-Based’ or ‘Third-Personal Judgement-Dependent’ accounts of mental content, which hold that, as an a priori matter, facts about a subject’s intentional states are determined by the judgements of a second person. I argue (...) that such accounts violate key constraints that any adequate judgement-dependent theory must satisfy. -/- . (shrink)

This treatise presents The Invariant Compass, a unified system of distinction, falsification, and causal clarity grounded in a single operation: Atomic Distinction (X = X). Beginning from the irreducible soil of Feeling (INVARIAN-0), the work traces a continuous logical path through five Invariants, the Five Tests falsification protocol with nine Sub-Tests, and a complete causal typology across four volumes. Central innovations include the active ontology of Feeling, the Vertical Shield, Serialitas, the Seasoned Hand, and the Two Entrances, demonstrating that the (...) system can be entered from either direction without altering any principle. Two appendices provide applied case studies auditing logical paradoxes, philosophical claims, and common everyday phrases. The treatise acknowledges its own status as a map, not a terminus, and invites each Pilot to seek the True Address personally. (shrink)

Faced with vivid cases of inferential knowledge to which false premises seem evidentially indispensable—knowledge-from-falsehood cases, or 'KFF cases'—some of us retreat from the traditional, Aristotelian view that only knowledge begets knowledge in reasoning. But KFF-ers are a minority in the debate over such cases. The epistemology of reasoning is still dominated by KDF-ers, those for whom, on close inspection, purported KFF cases turn out to be knowledge-despite-falsehood cases. Each group has its own warring factions. I belong with those who think (...) that every KDF proposal on the market is hopeless, which saddles me with the fundamental problem for KFF-ers: the task of explaining why some false premises are knowledge-suppressing, or 'malignant', while others are knowledge-yielding, or 'benign'. Some have suggested that a satisfactory KFF view might be found within truth-tracking epistemologies, either a safety-based theory or a sensitivity-based one. I examine the hypothesis and conclude that it fails. I then turn to the defeasibility theory of knowledge, a theory that has been deployed by its chief architect, Peter Klein, in defense of a KDF stance, and argue that the desired benign/malignant distinction can be found within a properly formulated, non-Kleinian defeasibility theory. (shrink)

It has long been observed, by persons of sound judgment and considerable patience, that the world suffers from an excess of confusion. The soil behaves unpredictably, producing abundance in one season and exhaustion in the next, as though it has not yet been properly instructed in its expected output. Markets fluctuate in ways that suggest a persistent unwillingness to consult the models designed to stabilize them. Citizens continue to act according to motives that resist clean articulation, pursuing ends that cannot (...) be reliably inferred from the incentives provided, and occasionally, with what can only be described as enthusiasm, doing the opposite of what they have been advised. Bodies persist in falling ill despite the clarity with which their mechanisms have been described, developing conditions that straddle the boundaries between the systems assigned to treat them. And the weather, after centuries of increasingly sophisticated observation, continues to conduct itself with a disregard for forecast that borders on insolence. In each case, the difficulty is not that we lack explanations, but that reality remains curiously indifferent to them. It is not hostile. It does not rebel. It simply does not appear to have read the literature. (shrink)

La inteligencia artificial generativa, en su configuración actual, exhibe una paradoja epistémica: amplía técnicamente el acceso al conocimiento al tiempo que restringe las condiciones de su producción crítica. Los modelos de lenguaje de gran escala (LLMs) operan bajo regímenes de verdad computacional que privilegian la verosimilitud estadística sobre la referencia y la justificación, produciendo así una externalización del juicio. Este artículo responde a dicha paradoja mediante la propuesta de una arquitectura cognitiva basada en complejos de indagación jerárquicos, inspirada en el (...) pragmatismo filosófico (Peirce, Dewey), la teoría dialógica del lenguaje (Bakhtin, Tannen) y la epistemología social (Fricker). La arquitectura materializa, en cinco módulos interdependientes —motor de indagación, navegador epistémico, generador contextual, diálogo adaptativo y rastreador de razonamiento—, los principios de trazabilidad, reversibilidad, pluralismo y contestabilidad, desplazando la lógica del prompt aislado hacia un modelo de navegación deliberativa. Para evaluar su funcionamiento, introducimos el Índice de Equilibrio Erotético (EEE), una métrica formativa y procesual que valora la calidad epistémica del proceso en cinco dimensiones: profundidad, pluralidad, trazabilidad, reversibilidad y robustez. En diálogo crítico con enfoques contemporáneos como Chain-of-Thought, Socratic Models y Constitutional AI, sostenemos que la propuesta no constituye una mejora incremental, sino una disrupción deliberativa: en lugar de simular razonamiento o aplicar principios normativos fijos, internaliza la indagación como estructura operativa. Sus aplicaciones en educación, derecho, ciencia y medicina muestran que su relevancia no se mide por la eficiencia instrumental, sino por la capacidad de instituir entornos epistémicamente responsables, donde preguntar, justificar y sostener el disenso son condiciones centrales. Con ello, el artículo defiende que el futuro de una IA epistémicamente activa no debe orientarse a perfeccionar la plausibilidad de las respuestas, sino a restaurar el juicio en el corazón de la computación, configurándola como una infraestructura de deliberación crítica y plural. Palabras clave: Externalización del juicio, Regímenes de verdad computacional, Arquitecturas cognitivas generativas, Complejos de indagación jerárquicos, Índice de Equilibrio Erotético (EEE), Disrupción deliberativa, Epistemología computacional, IA epistémicamente activa, Pragmatismo y dialogismo, Justicia epistémica en IA. (shrink)

In the epistemology of peer disagreement, Conciliationism holds that discovering a disagreement with an epistemic peer rationally requires substantial revision in one’s credence. A novel explanation for this rational requirement, Accountability Thesis (Peter, Synthese 190(7):1253-1266, 2013), argues that it is grounded in irreducibly second-personal reasons arising from a relationship of mutual accountability between deliberating agents. This essay challenges this second-personal approach, arguing in favour of an explanation that invokes no irreducibly second-personal reasons. The alternative explanation, which appeals only to third-personal (...) evidence and first-personal norms of rationality, is argued to be explanatorily superior. It is more parsimonious and possesses greater explanatory scope, accounting for cases Accountability Thesis cannot, such as disagreement with absent epistemic peers. Furthermore, it provides a more complete account by integrating the dual evidential role of peer disagreement as both first-order testimonial evidence and higher-order evidence of one’s own fallibility. The essay does not argue that there could be no procedural epistemic obligations in deliberation with epistemic peers; such a claim would rule out other plausible understandings of epistemic peerhood. Nonetheless, it concludes that insofar as argument for Accountability Thesis operates within a standard Conciliationist framework, its second-personal explanation for Conciliationism does not succeed. (shrink)

This article proposes a vision of philosophy as living water: a practice grounded in clarity, affectivity, and interpretative freedom. Through a historical and exemplary exploration, the paper argues that philosophical understanding is not a product of abstraction or conceptual rigidity, but a dynamic process shaped by the situated observer. Clarity is examined as an ethical responsibility rather than a stylistic preference; affectivity as an essential dimension of human cognition; and interpretative freedom as the condition that allows meaning to remain fluid, (...) open, and responsive to lived experience. Drawing on diverse philosophical traditions and emblematic figures, the article shows how philosophy becomes most transformative when it flows when it adapts, nourishes, and illuminates without imposing dogmatic structures. Ultimately, the work defends a model of philosophy that is accessible, embodied, and alive: a practice capable of renewing understanding and fostering a more humane relationship with meaning. (shrink)

This article applies the Architecture of Reasoning to the analysis of paradoxes, demonstrating that classical paradoxes serve as diagnostic signals of architectural violations. We classify 46 paradoxes into three categories: structural paradoxes (13), which violate the vertical dimension of the Law of Order through hierarchical level confusion; defective paradoxes (25), which contain aws in their premises—conceptual indeterminacy, contradiction, false assumptions, or category errors; and non-paradoxes (8), which produce counter-intuitive but correct results without contradiction. The method of domain analysis transforms paradoxes (...) from mysteries into exercises. Each paradox passes through the six domains of reasoning; the point of failure becomes visible; the apparent contradiction dissolves. We provide detailed analyses of ten paradigmatic paradoxes (Liar, Russell, Sorites, Ship of Theseus, Unexpected Hanging, Newcomb, Carroll's Tortoise, Hilbert's Hotel, Galileo's Paradox, and Banach-Tarski) and classify the remainder. The framework connects to the formal Theory of Systems, where key paradoxes (Russell, Cantor) are blocked structurally through Coq-veried proofs. Future directions include integration with fallacy detection systems and applications to AI reasoning verification. (shrink)

This article develops the horizontal dimension of the Law of Order—the fifth law of logic established in a companion article—showing how it manifests in reasoning through six necessary domains: Recognition, Clarification, Framework Selection, Comparison, Inference, and Reflection. These domains constitute the minimal architecture of directed thinking: cognitive territories that any valid reasoning must traverse in logical sequence. The central thesis comprises two claims. The necessity claim holds that domains cannot be skipped—not as psychological limitation but as logical impossibility. One cannot (...) compare objects not yet recognized, draw inferences from comparisons not yet made, or reflect on conclusions not yet reached. Each domain creates conditions without which subsequent domains cannot occur. The correspondence claim holds that domains work because they track the structure of reality itself: givenness (Recognition), determinateness (Clarification), multiaspectuality (Framework Selection), connectedness (Comparison), necessity (Inference), and inexhaustibility (Reflection). Each domain is governed by a principle derived from the classical laws of logic. The Principle of Presence (from Identity) governs Recognition; the Principle of Infinite Questions (from Sufficient Reason) governs Clarification; the Principle of Objectivity (from NonContradiction) governs Framework Selection; and so forth. These principles are not arbitrary recommendations but necessary conditions for achieving truth. The article establishes domain architecture as a diagnostic framework: errors in reasoning become locatable as violations of specific domains or principles. Future work will apply this framework systematically to fallacy classification and paradox dissolution. (shrink)

Frequently people draw on different domains of knowledge to reach a conclusion that seems reasonable despite being difficult to justify from the perspective of a single domain. For example, there appears to be no reason for ethics to involve mathematics, nor is there a mechanism in mathematics to embrace moral questions; however, both ethics and mathematics are likely to be involved in resolving questions about how an autonomous vehicle should make decisions in a social context. In this paper, we present (...) a specialized mode of reasoning, transepistemic abduction (TeA), which establishes how two agents, in order to satisfactorily explain a phenomenon, reason across two epistemic domains despite each agent being ignorant of the other’s domain knowledge. We formalize TeA with epistemic logic and provide a naturalized example that brings together a psychosocial agent and a computational agent for the analysis of subjective text. We find that interaction between agents is critical to the process of TeA and that there are limits to the formalization while remaining true to naturalized reasoning. We conclude with some important implications of these findings for future work in this area. (shrink)

The Universal Principle of Collapse (UPC) has been applied to ideological, classical, quantum, and cosmological paradoxes. This paper presents a behavioral–operational demonstration of UPC within an artificial cognitive system. Using a structured session with a large language model (LLM), we enforce explicit recognition operators to test collapse, misalignment, and stabilization. Results show that paradox persists when recognition is implicit, collapse emerges when linguistic fluency substitutes for explicit operator‑level validation, and coherence appears only when recognition is enforced step‑by‑step. These behaviors confirm (...) UPC as a universal diagnostic framework for cognition and language, observable, reproducible, and empirically valid in the behavioral–operational sense. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates that infinite regress cannot begin. Contrary to the common assumption that regress must be terminated, the argument here shows that the explanatory relations used to construct regress chains—causal, grounding, justificatory, or cosmological—presuppose the admissibility structure of a domain. These admissibility conditions are not elements of the domain and therefore cannot be subjected to the intra-domain relations that generate regress sequences. Any attempt to initiate a regress is thus a category mistake: it applies an internal relation to the (...) very meta-structural condition that enables the relation. By reconstructing the structure of explanation at a meta-logical level, the paper dissolves the regress problem entirely. It further clarifies why first-cause theories, foundationalist proposals, and boundary-condition cosmologies fail to address the structural issue. The result is a general framework for future work in meta-logic, cosmology, and the theory of explanation. (shrink)

Transparency is the view that the deliberative question whether to believe P gives way to the question whether P. In this paper, I argue that transparency is false. I begin by teasing out two commitments of transparency: (i) the set of possible answers to the question whether to believe P is the same set of possible answers to the question whether P; (ii) the question whether to believe P can be settled on the basis of all and only those considerations (...) on the basis of which the question whether P can be settled. Against (i), I argue that a distinct type of suspended judgment constitutes an answer to whether to believe P, but not whether P. Against (ii), I argue that the question whether to believe P, but not the question whether P, can be settled partly on the basis of considerations about which evidential standards to use. (shrink)

Philosophical work on the nature of thought has, until recently, focused primarily on what it is for an individual to think, leaving aside important questions about the intersubjective dimension of thought. For example: in what sense, if any, can thoughts really be shared? Is there a shareability requirement on successful communication, disagreement or the transmission of knowledge? Do particular types of thought such as those based on perception or self-location raise distinctive challenges to their shareability? More generally, how should we (...) understand the communication and coordination of our thoughts in exchanges with others? Are there distinctive rationality constraints governing the intersubjective aspects of thought? Sharing Thoughts brings together original work by established and emerging philosophers to address these and related foundational issues, while also paying attention to more specific questions such as the interplay between the intersubjectivity of thought and the internalism/externalism debate, the elucidation of first-person or egocentric thought, our capacity for joint thinking, the conditions for knowledge transmission and collective inquiry, the expression of thought in music, and more. (shrink)

Changing our minds isn’t easy. Even when we recognize our views are disputed by intelligent and informed people, we rarely doubt our rightness. Why is this so? How can we become more open-minded, putting ourselves in a better position to tolerate conflict, advance collective inquiry, and learn from differing perspectives in a complex world? In this engrossing, provocative book, Nathan Ballantyne defends the indispensable role of epistemology in tackling these issues. For early modern philosophers, the point of reflecting on inquiry (...) was to understand how our beliefs are often distorted by prejudice and self-interest, and to improve the foundations of human knowledge. Ballantyne seeks to recover and modernize this classical tradition by vigorously defending an interdisciplinary approach to epistemology, blending philosophical theorizing with insights from the social and cognitive sciences. We need tools to help us think more circumspectly about our controversial views. Ballantyne develops a method for distinguishing between our reasonable and unreasonable opinions, in light of evidence about bias, information overload, and rival experts. This method guides us to greater intellectual openness—in the spirit of skeptics from Socrates to Montaigne to Bertrand Russell—making us more inclined to admit that sometimes we don’t have the right answers. With vibrant prose and fascinating examples from science and history, Ballantyne shows how epistemology can help us know our limits. (shrink)

How to Fight Back Against the Youth Sleep Crisis: A Critical Analysis of Screen-Free Sleep in the Digital Age.

Scientists regularly appeal to broadly aesthetic qualities such as elegance, beauty, and simplicity when evaluating theories. For example, the geologist Émile Argand said that “the elegance with which drift theory explains these significant facts … is certainly a strong point in its favour” and the physicist Paul Dirac said about general relativity that its “real foundations come from the great beauty of the theory”. But how can aesthetics be epistemically relevant? In this thesis, I present an account according to which (...) aesthetic experiences can function as signals of epistemic value. Very roughly, it says that aesthetic feelings concerning scientific theories are the upshots of metacognitive processes which respond to features of epistemic value and signal the success of one’s cognitive engagement with theory and evidence. Through a detailed case study of the role of aesthetics in the development and acceptance of the theory of plate tectonics and by providing an explanation of how aesthetic experiences can be epistemically valuable, I show that there is reason for optimism about the role of aesthetic considerations in science: aesthetic pleasure is a moderately good indicator of epistemic success. (shrink)

In this article, I draw on the social intentionality hypothesis to develop an account of cognitive integration. My account sheds light on the variety of cognitive integration that has been of most interest to epistemologists by arguing that it is best understood as the intrapersonal analogue of a paradigmatically interpersonal problem. Furthermore, the intrapersonal version of the problem is solved by simulating the solution to the interpersonal version. Consequently, we better understand the intrapersonal version of the problem relevant to epistemology (...) by considering the interpersonal version. (shrink)

These provocative essays by leading philosophers of science exemplify and illuminate the contemporary uncertainty and excitement in this changing field. The papers are rich in new perspectives, and their far-reaching criticisms challenge arguments long prevalent in classic philosophical problems of induction, empiricism, and realism. By turns empirical or analytic, historical or programmatic, confessional or argumentative, the authors' arguments both describe and demonstrate the fact that philosophy of science is in a ferment more intense than at any time since the heyday (...) of logical positivism seventy years ago. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to explore the possibility of introducing a new theoretical model of deductive reasoning into the psychology of reasoning. This new theoretical model, which we will call here the theory of reasoning by goals, has as its main property to make every characteristic of deductive reasoning depend on the goal employed by an agent to be able to reason. The theoretical context within which this goal must be framed is therefore that of the agency, here (...) understood in a generic way as the ability that each individual has, in his or her role as agent, to pursue his or her own ends through the achievement of specific goals. (shrink)

This volume treats the topic of rationality developing a perspective that integrates elements of philosophy of language, phenomenology, pragmatism, and philosophy of life. The two reference authors, Wittgenstein and Ortega, are contemporaries but come from different philosophical traditions. Wittgenstein's early work was influenced by logical positivism. Later he developed an influential approach to philosophy of language. Ortega was influenced by Neo-Kantianism, perspectivism, life philosophy, and phenomenology. On this basis, he developed an independent approach that has become known as ratiovitalism. Astonishing (...) affinities between their respective reflections on rationality motivated the experiment of bringing the different approaches into a synergetic relation. Both investigate the structures and limits of rationality, emphasize the importance of basic beliefs, and criticize the restriction of rationality concepts to the intellectual sphere. The contributions of the volume focus on: dynamics of belief and knowledge, implicit and explicit knowledge, the concept of “vital reason”, the role of world-pictures and forms of life, questions regarding certainty, ignorance, doubt, and madness, as well as matters of pluralism and relativism. (shrink)

This essay posits the "Philosophy of the Zaguán" as a conceptual framework for contemporary Latin American thought, proposing a dialectical overcoming of the denunciatory phases characteristic of Liberation Philosophy and Decolonial Studies. It is argued that the Latin American ontological condition can be defined as a "Being-in-the-Zaguán," a constitutive form of existence within the liminal threshold between the self and the other. From this ontology, a necessary epistemological inference is derived: the "Threshold Knowledge" (Saber de Umbral). This mode of knowing—analyzed (...) through its principles of methodological mestizaje (sentipensar), situated corporeality, and a hermeneutics of critical hospitality— is presented as a rigorous and original paradigm for producing knowledge from and for the region, in dialogue with the world. The analysis is grounded in an articulated re-reading of Rodolfo Kusch, Enrique Dussel, Walter Mignolo, Gloria Anzaldúa, Orlando Fals Borda, and Édouard Glissant. (shrink)

"We bring out the ‘genius’ in you." Pi (Conservation of the Circle) Controls the Circular-Linear Relationship responsible for Everything in Nature. -/- .

Human beings are both supremely rational and deeply superstitious, capable of believing just about anything and of questioning just about everything. Indeed, just as our reason demands that we know the truth, our skepticism leads to doubts we can ever really do so. In Walking the Tightrope of Reason, Robert J. Fogelin guides readers through a contradiction that lies at the very heart of philosophical inquiry. Fogelin argues that our rational faculties insist on a purely rational account of the universe, (...) yet at the same time, the inherent limitations of these faculties ensure that we will never fully satisfy that demand. As a result of being driven to this point of paradox, we either comfort ourselves with what Kant called "metaphysical illusions" or adopt a stance of radical skepticism. No middle ground seems possible and, as Fogelin shows, skepticism, even though a healthy dose of it is essential for living a rational life, "has an inherent tendency to become unlimited in its scope, with the result that the edifice of rationality is destroyed." In much Postmodernist thought, for example, skepticism takes the extreme form of absolute relativism, denying the basis for any value distinctions and treating all truth-claims as equally groundless. How reason avoids disgracing itself, walking a fine line between dogmatic belief and self-defeating doubt, is the question Fogelin seeks to answer. Reflecting upon the ancient Greek skeptics as well as such thinkers as Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, and Whitman, this book takes readers into--and through--some of philosophy's most troubling paradoxes. (shrink)

The Power of Critical Thinking: Effective Reasoning About Ordinary and Extraordinary Claims explores the essentials of critical reasoning, argumentation, logic, and argumentative essay writing while also incorporating important topics that most other texts leave out, such as "inference to the best explanation," scientific reasoning, evidence and authority, visual reasoning, and obstacles to critical thinking.The text integrates many pedagogical features, including hundreds of diverse exercises, examples, and illustrations; text boxes that apply critical thinking to student experience; step-by-step guidelines for evaluating claims, (...) arguments, and explanations; a glossary of important terms; and many reminders, summaries, and review notes. New to this editionNew sections on topics suggested by reviewers - The coverage now includes more discussion of legal reasoning, rhetorical ploys, informal fallacies, probability and statistics, and necessary and sufficient conditions.New Essays for Analysis - Nine essays, several of them by women authors, have been added to the collection of "Essays for Evaluation" in Appendix A (the total remains at twenty-one), each article accompanied by writing prompts and linked to writing assignments in every chapter. Four pairs of essays are arranged in a pro/con format, each pair debating a single issue. New topics include homosexuality, feminists and pornography, adultery, airport security screenings, women in Afghanistan, Islamic extremists and free speech, and fear of vaccines.New text boxes on current topics. The division of labor for the text boxes is the same, but some of the content is new. The three types of boxes are "Newsmakers" (discussions of current events and issues in the media illustrating a principle of critical thinking, ending with questions meant to encourage critical thought); "From the Web" (boxes concentrating on a lesson about critical thinking but drawing their material from websites and blogs); and "Further Thought" (informative boxes, designed to cover interesting supplementary material not discussed in the main text).The chapter objectives now correspond to the point-by-point summary at the end of each chapter.Important Clarifications - The following discussions are now even clearer: scientific conservatism in theory choice, the relationship between enumerative induction and statistical syllogisms, and informal fallacies (the latter are given further treatment in an explanatory fallacies chart on the inside front cover).Some new discussions: the straw man fallacy, biased opinion polls, dishonest political discourse, and gut reactions and intuitions. (shrink)

The ‘heart’, an object of misunderstanding in a sentimentalist sense, condenses in Pascal’s thought a plurality of meanings that make it, in several respects, an anthropologically pregnant and fundamental ‘place’ for the understanding of his philosophy. The apparent opposition between heart and reason should be overcome in a complementary understanding, in which the former represents the intellectual-intuitive moment of the apprehension of principles that precedes the discursive development of reason and its foundation and condition of practice. In the heart, however, (...) there is also the significance of the biblical-patristic tradition, familiar to Pascal, of the moral and spiritual barycentre of the person and, from there, the common root of the intellectual and volitional powers, where the unity of experience firmly unites the knowing and the loving of being, so that authentic knowledge is revealed as the love of the intended reality and, vice versa, this alone guarantees the cognitive relationship as the experience of truth. In this way, we find in the heart the place and expression of a sentimental dimension that is also profoundly human and harmoniously united to the rationality proper to the thinking nature of man. (shrink)

The volume aims to investigate one of the most layered and pivotal concepts in the philosophical tradition: reason, understood not only as an intellectual faculty but also as a historical force and organizing principle. The book stems from a shared intellectual project initiated at the conference held in Foggia in March 2023, later enriched by contributions developed within PRIN research programs, with the goal of expanding and deepening the inquiry into the theme. Adopting an interdisciplinary and intercultural lens, the volume (...) gathers essays that explore the concept of reason across different philosophical contexts: from classical Greek thought to Christian and Islamic medieval philosophy, from Cartesian and Kantian modernity to contemporary critiques, including lesser-studied fields such as alchemical practices. The collection highlights both the faith in rationality as a driver of human progress and its historical contradictions, epistemological ambiguities, and ethical-political limitations. A central focus lies on the tension between reason and history: on one hand, reason as a guiding force in human development; on the other, history as a testing ground for its validity, as well as a domain of crisis and transformation. This dialectic permeates the volume, offering a multifaceted and critical understanding of a concept that remains central to the human condition. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In Nora Heinzelmann's recent ‘Rationality is not Coherence,’ she sets out a novel and forceful challenge for coherence accounts of rationality (henceforth: CRs). Heinzelmann argues that, first, there are cases in which the norms in CRs generate conflict and, thus, agents cannot be rational; but, second, it is counterintuitive that agents cannot be rational in these cases; and, third, reasons responsiveness accounts of rationality (henceforth: RRs) do not have this counterintuitive result. From this, Heinzelmann concludes that RRs are superior to (...) CRs. In this article, I argue that Heinzelmann is mistaken. In Section I, I introduce the two CR norms on which Heinzelmann focuses, Enkrasia and Persistence of Intention. In Section II, I discuss Heinzelmann's argument against Enkrasia. In Section III, I discuss Heinzelmann's argument against the conjunction of Enkrasia and Persistence of Intention. (shrink)

'Nous sommes devenus superforts. Rien ne peut nous résister : la plus grande œuvre d'art, l'action la plus héroïque, l'entreprise la plus noble, la figure la plus impeccable - elles ne le sont que pour autant que nous le voulions bien. Chacun d'entre nous, partout dans le monde, et quoi qu'il en soit de sa richesse ou de sa pauvreté, de sa culture ou de son ignorance, nous sommes plus forts que tout. La superforce est la condition contemporaine de l'être (...) humain. Pour nous, humains du XXIe siècle, plus de réalité qui ne soit bornée par un "Oui, mais". Qui, aujourd'hui, sauf un abruti ou un niais, oserait dire qu'il n'est pas critique? Qu'il ou elle n'a pas d'esprit critique? La raison moderne, la raison critique, parce qu'elle est d'abord une interrogation sur elle-même, comme l'avait dit Emmanuel Kant, ne peut connaître d'autre limite ni d'autre alternative qu'elle-même. De sorte qu'elle a fini par dévorer la totalité du champ du pensable. Il est temps de faire le point sur le programme critique et de se poser la question de ce qu'il a laissé de côté. Et la réponse que je propose est : il a laissé de côté le futur. Il n'y a pas d'après de la critique, parce que l'idéal de la critique est le champ de ruine où survivrait une luciole, où pousserait une pâquerette.' Dans ce livre-étendard d'une génération nouvelle, scintillant d'idées, d'arguments et d'exemples, Laurent de Sutter appelle à renouer avec le sens du futur, à quitter le mode du 'oui, mais' pour épouser celui du 'et si', à redevenir superfaibles et... libres à nouveau."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Explaining how people reason is central to understanding ourselves as human beings. Complex deliberations that take unexpected turns are central to many good detective stories, but they are also ubiquitous in everyday life and academic research. While philosophers have studied both ends of complex deliberations – learning new information and reaching justified conclusions – little has been said about our states of mind when we’re in the middle of thought. Yet, this stage of intellectual limbo is where we often produce (...) genuine insight. Integrating theoretical research in philosophy with empirical results from cognitive science, this project advances a new theory of the transitional stages of complex deliberation. It postulates a new attitude type, transitional attitudes, that we hold towards potential answers to the question at hand while we’re deliberating. Transitional attitudes possess their own rationality conditions that differ from the norms of rationality typically applied to conclusions of reasoning. The resulting abstract framework reveals deep structural similarities among such varied intellectual pursuits as determining the significance of a historical artifact, deciding on a person’s guilt in court, deliberating about a philosophical problem, or searching for a mathematical proof. It can help us make progress on difficult philosophical questions, such as how we should respond to misleading higher-order evidence, how we should formally model logical learning, and how confident we can rationally be in our own philosophical positions. -/- . (shrink)

Reasoning that leads to delusions—especially in schizophrenia—appears beyond the bounds of sense, profoundly inaccessible. By analyzing empirical research on reasoning that supports delusions in schizophrenia, I demonstrate that such reasoning can be made intelligible at the personal level. Specifically, I propose that these empirical findings can be positively characterized as reflecting a distinctive epistemic style—a unique implementation of reason rather than its absence. Delusion-supporting reasoning in schizophrenia can be understood as expressing epistemic values and preferences characteristic of a maverick epistemic (...) personality. As such, it is substantially intelligible in light of these underlying values. Further, I argue that the presence of this epistemic style in individuals with schizophrenia can itself be understood in light of their anomalous experiences and social exclusion. This view contributes to reducing stigma and provides new resources for theorizing non-standard interactions with evidence within the neurodiversity paradigm. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

La philosophie peut être considérée comme une recherche conceptuelle soumise aux normes habituelles de rationalité. Cependant, il ne semble pas y avoir un en-semble de critères qui fait consensus pour évaluer et comparer les théories philosophiques. D’un point de vue heuristique et érotétique, la philosophie est ici con-sidérée comme un ensemble de réflexions de second ordre à propos des présupposés de théories plus spécifiques. Ces présupposés sont évalués en fonction de leur caractère informatif, de leur adéquation, de leur pertinence, de (...) leur généralité et de leur originalité. En tant que pratique, on peut procéder vers le haut (des problèmes aux présupposés) ou vers le bas (des présupposés comme conditions de signification des affirmations en question). Mais en tant que produit, une théorie philosophique doit être évaluée en fonction de la manière dont elle contribue à favoriser la connaissance et qu’elle aide à apprendre, poser et résoudre de nouvelles questions. (shrink)

The eighth edition of The Power of Critical Thinking has three aims: keep what works, add more of the same where needed, and drop what doesn't. In this case, "what works" means consistency with the insights and needs of teachers of critical thinking. You will find that this new edition tries hard to do all these jobs, and a few others as well. The book's original goals still guide its content and presentation: to provide comprehensive coverage of basic critical thinking (...) skills, to include important features and topics often ignored by other texts, and to present all this in a plain-spoken, lively style that encourages students to think, reason, and learn. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of committed beliefs: beliefs we commit to through reflection and conscious reasoning. To help make sense of committed beliefs, I present a new view of conscious reasoning, one of putting yourself in a position to become phenomenally consciously aware of evidence. By doing this for different pieces of evidence, you begin to make your up mind, making conscious reasoning, as such, a voluntary activity with an involuntary conclusion. The paper then explains how we use conscious (...) reasoning in reflection not just to form and change committed beliefs, but to become aware of existing ones. The paper concludes with an explanation of how the limitations of conscious reasoning require us to maintain committed beliefs in a system. It is our maintenance of this system that allows us to knit together individual episodes of conscious reasoning into one enduring performance as a committed systematic believer. (shrink)

Emotions can be insensitive to certain attributes of a situation: Fear of flying is not always reduced by remembering air crash probabilities. A large body of evidence shows that information on probabilities, large numerical counts, and intentions is frequently disregarded in the elicitation and regulation of emotions. To date, no existing theory comprehensively accounts for the features that tend to be overlooked by emotion. In this paper, I call attention to the common denominator of such features: they do not contribute (...) to the iconic representation of events. For instance, the exceedingly low probability of a plane crash does not affect its imagistic representation (i.e., the iconic representation of the event is silent about the event’s probability). This paper introduces the Iconic Prioritization Hypothesis, positing that the prioritization of input in the iconic format by emotions can explain the neglect of information that is representationally silent in this format. Delving into the causes of this format prioritization, I argue that emotion might favour iconicity as it is the format of immediate information about our surroundings (perception) and of stored first-hand evidence (episodic memory). Lastly, the hypothesis's compatibility with philosophical theories of emotion causation and its implications for experimental research are examined. (shrink)

From academic writing to personal and public discourse, the need for good arguments and better ways of arguing is greater than ever before. This timely fifth edition of A Rulebook for Arguments sharpens an already-classic text, adding updated examples and a new chapter on public debates that provides rules for the etiquette and ethics of sound public dialogue as well as clear and sound thinking in general.

Recognizing arguments -- Analyzing arguments -- Evaluating arguments -- Some valid argument forms -- More valid argument forms: categorical reasoning and venn diagrams -- Causal analysis -- Argument by analogy and models -- Errors in reasoning: fallacies -- Definition -- Vagueness and ambiguity -- Reasonable beliefs -- Rules for writing.

Critical thinking -- Critical reading: getting started -- Critical reading: getting deeper into arguments -- Visual rhetoric: thinking about images as arguments -- Writing an analysis of an argument -- Developing an argument of your own -- Using sources -- A philosopher's view : the Toulmin model -- A logician's view : deduction, induction, fallacies -- A psychologist's view : Rogerian argument -- A literary critic's view: arguing about literature -- A debater's view: individual oral presentations and debate -- Student (...) loans : should some indebtedness be forgiven? -- Technology in the classroom: useful or distracting? -- The local food movement : is it a better way to eat? -- The current state of childhood: is "helicopter parenting" or "free-range childhood" better for kids? -- Genetic modification of human beings : is it acceptable? -- Mandatory military service: should it be required? -- College education : what is its purpose? -- Race and police violence: how do we solve the problem? -- Junk food : should the government regulate our intake? -- Online versus IRL: how has social networking changed how we relate to one another? -- Immigration: what is to be done? -- The carceral state: why are so many Americans in jail? -- American exceptionalism: how should the United States teach about its past? -- What is the ideal society? -- How free is the will of the individual within society? -- What is happiness? (shrink)

Now reissued for contemporary readers, this entertaining primer on critical thinking has been teaching people to think and speak more clearly for more than four decades. Do you know when you're being deceived? Can you trust the information coming from Washington, the media, and the Internet? This classic work on critical thinking uses a novel approach to teach the basics of informal logic. On the assumption that "it takes one to know one," the authors have written the book from the (...) point of view of someone who wishes to deceive, mislead, or manipulate others. Having mastered the art of deception, readers will then be able to detect the misuse or abuse of logic when they encounter it in others -- whether in a heated political debate or while trying to evaluate the claims of a persuasive sales person. Using a host of real-world examples, the authors show you how to win an argument, defend a case, recognize a fallacy, see through deception, persuade a skeptic, and turn defeat into victory. Whether you're evaluating a social media rumor or you just want to become more adept at making your points and analyzing others' arguments, The Art of Deception--now with an updated preface--will give you the intellectual tools to become a more effective thinker and speaker. Helpful exercises and discussion questions are also included. (shrink)

Introduction: Close encounter with the strange -- The possibility to impossible -- Arguments good, bad, and weird -- Knowledge, belief, and evidence -- Looking for truth in personal experience -- Science and its pretenders -- Case studies in the extraordinary -- Relativism, truth, and reality.

Philosophy can be an extremely technical and complex affair, one whose terminology and procedures are often intimidating to the beginner and demanding even for the professional. Like that of surgery, the art of philosophy requires mastering a body of knowledge as well as acquiring precision and skill with a set of instruments or tools. The Philosopher's Toolkit may be thought of as a collection of just such tools. Unlike those of a surgeon or a master woodworker, however, the instruments presented (...) by this text are conceptual - tools that can be used to enter, analyse, criticise, and evaluate philosophical concepts, arguments, visions, and theories. The Toolkit can be used in a variety of ways. It can be read cover to cover by those looking for instruction on the essentials of philosophical reflection. Or it can be used as a course book on basic philosophical method or critical thinking. It can also be used as a reference book to which general readers and more advanced philosophers can turn in order to find quick and clear accounts of the key concepts and methods of philosophy. The book is assembled so that there is a natural, logical order from start to finish, but one can also start wherever one likes, just as one might play any song on a record album first. The aim of the book, in other words, is to act as a conceptual toolbox from which all those from neophytes to master artisans can draw instruments that would otherwise be distributed over a diverse set of texts and require long periods of study to acquire. (shrink)

In this witty, incisive guide to critical thinking the author provides you with the tools to allow you to question beliefs and assumptions held by those who claim to know what they're talking about.