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Philosophical Quarterly

73 found
  1.  88
    Shared Agency Without Shared Intention.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):665-688.
    The leading reductive approaches to shared agency model that phenomenon in terms of complexes of individual intentions, understood as plan-laden commitments. Yet not all agents have such intentions, and non-planning agents such as small children and some non-human animals are clearly capable of sophisticated social interactions. But just how robust are their social capacities? Are non-planning agents capable of shared agency? Existing theories of shared agency have little to say about these important questions. I address this lacuna by developing a (...)
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  2.  6
    The Price of Twin Earth.Brandon James Ashby - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):689-710.
    Liberals about perceptual contents claim that perceptual experiences can represent kinds and specific, familiar individuals as such; they also claim that the representation of an individual or kind as such by a perceptual experience will be reflected in the phenomenal character of that experience. Conservatives always deny the latter and sometimes also the former claim. I argue that neither liberals nor conservatives have adequately appreciated how the content internalism/externalism debate bears on their views. I show that perceptual content internalism entails (...)
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  3.  164
    Certainty in Action.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):711-737.
    When is it permissible to rely on a proposition in practical reasoning? Standard answers to this question face serious challenges. This paper uses these challenges to motivate a certainty norm of practical reasoning. This norm holds that one is permitted to rely on p in practical reasoning if and only if p is epistemically certain. After developing and defending this norm, I consider its broader implications. Taking a certainty norm seriously calls into question traditional assumptions about the importance of belief (...)
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  4.  36
    Epistemic Judgement and Motivation.Cameron Boult & Sebastian Köhler - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):738-758.
    Is there an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism? The answer to this question has implications for our understanding of the nature of epistemic normativity. For example, some philosophers have argued from claims that epistemic judgement is not necessarily motivating to the view that epistemic judgement is not normative. This paper examines the options for spelling out an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism. It is argued that the most promising approach connects epistemic judgements to doxastic dispositions, which are related (...)
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  5.  3
    Saving People From the Harm of Death.Karl Ekendahl - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):871-873.
    Saving People From the Harm of Death. Edited by Gamlund Espen, Solberg Carl Tollef.
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  6.  133
    The Logic of Conditional Belief.Benjamin Eva - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):759-779.
    The logic of indicative conditionals remains the topic of deep and intractable philosophical disagreement. I show that two influential epistemic norms—the Lockean theory of belief and the Ramsey test for conditional belief—are jointly sufficient to ground a powerful new argument for a particular conception of the logic of indicative conditionals. Specifically, the argument demonstrates, contrary to the received historical narrative, that there is a real sense in which Stalnaker’s semantics for the indicative did succeed in capturing the logic of the (...)
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  7.  7
    Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility.Anneli Jefferson - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):868-870.
    Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility. Edited By Hutchison Katrina, Mackenzie Catriona, Oshana Marina.
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  8.  10
    Phenomenal Relations and Collective Essence.Yannic Kappes - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):800-808.
    Antonin Broi argues that the thesis of phenomenal revelation is in tension with the best available accounts of similarity and certain other relations between phenomenal properties and should hence be rejected. In the following, I investigate Broi’s argument, show how the notion of collective essence can be used to withstand it, and consider a corresponding “collective” version of the revelation thesis.
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  9.  1
    Mark Sinclair, Bergson.Leonard Lawlor - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):874-876.
    Mark Sinclair, Bergson. London: Routledge, 2020. $33.95 PB.
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  10.  13
    On the Genealogy of Universals: The Metaphysical Origins of Analytic Philosophy. [REVIEW]Samuel Lebens - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):877-880.
    On the Genealogy of Universals: The Metaphysical Origins of Analytic Philosophy. By Macbride Fraser.
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  11.  22
    Dispositional Pluralism. [REVIEW]Vassilis Livanios - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):881-883.
    Dispositional Pluralism. By McKitrick Jennifer.
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  12.  188
    The New Ledoux: Survival Circuits and the Surplus Meaning of ‘Fear’.Raamy Majeed - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):809-829.
    ABSTRACT LeDoux's pioneering work on the neurobiology of fear has played a crucial role in informing debates in the philosophy of emotion. For example, it plays a key part in Griffiths’ argument for why emotions don’t form a natural kind. Likewise, it is employed by Faucher and Tappolet to defend pro-emotion views, which claim that emotions aid reasoning. LeDoux, however, now argues that his work has been misread. He argues that using emotion terms, like ‘fear’, to describe neurocognitive data adds (...)
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  13.  16
    Endless and Infinite.Alex Malpass & Wes Morriston - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):830-849.
    It is often said that time must have a beginning because otherwise the series of past events would have the paradoxical features of an actual infinite. In the present paper, we show that, even given a dynamic theory of time, the cardinality of an endless series of events, each of which will occur, is the same as that of a beginningless series of events, each of which has occurred. Both are denumerably infinite. So if an endless series of events is (...)
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  14.  4
    The Importance of Being Rational.Carlos Núñez - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):884-886.
    The Importance of Being Rational. By Lord Errol.
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  15.  11
    Should We Sacrifice the Utilitarians First?Saul Smilansky - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):850-867.
    It is commonly thought that morality applies universally to all human beings as moral targets, and our general moral obligations to people will not, as a rule, be affected by their views. I propose and explore a radical, alternative normative moral theory, ‘Designer Ethics’, according to which our views are pro tanto crucial determinants of how, morally, we ought to be treated. For example, since utilitarians are more sympathetic to the idea that human beings may be sacrificed for the greater (...)
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  16.  23
    The Limitations of the Open Mind. [REVIEW]Gregory Stoutenburg - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):887-889.
    The Limitations of the Open Mind. By Fantl Jeremy.
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  17.  1
    Medieval Philosophy.Sara L. Uckelman - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):890-892.
    Review of Adamson Peter, Medieval Philosophy, History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps, volume 4, xxii+637pp. Reviewed by Sara L. Uckelman, Department of Philosophy, Durham University, s.l.uckelman@durham.ac.uk.
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  18.  14
    Evaluative Perception.N. Athanassoulis - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):633-636.
    Evaluative Perception. By Bergqvist Anna, Cowan Robert.
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  19.  12
    Trust-Based Theories of Promising.Daniele Bruno - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):443-463.
    This paper discusses the prospects of a comprehensive philosophical account of promising that relies centrally on the notion of trust. I lay out the core idea behind the Trust View, showing how it convincingly explains the normative contours and the unique value of our promissory practice. I then sketch three distinct options of how the Trust View can explain the normativity of promises. First, an effect based-view, second, a view drawing on a wider norm demanding respect to those whom one (...)
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  20.  39
    Grief and Composition as Identity.C. E. Garland - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):464-479.
    ‘It feels like I have lost a part of myself’ is frequently uttered by those grieving the death of a loved one. Despite the ubiquity of such utterances, and the palpable sense that they express something true, few philosophers have considered what, if anything, accounts for their truth. Here, I develop a suggestion from Donald Baxter according to which Composition as Identity provides us a means to understand the grief utterances literally. In doing so, I identify and develop a version (...)
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  21.  8
    Reflective Equilibrium and the Principles of Logical Analysis: Understanding the Laws of Logic.Berta Grimau - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):636-639.
    Reflective equilibrium and the principles of logical analysis: Understanding the laws of logic. By Peregrin Jaroslav, Svoboda Vladimír.
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  22.  21
    Transparency and Self-Knowledge.Sophie Keeling - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):639-642.
    Transparency and Self-Knowledge. By Byrne Alex.
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  23.  3
    Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction.Workineh Kelbessa - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):642-645.
    Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction. By Attf ield Robin.
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  24.  12
    Football: The Philosophy Behind the Game.Simon Kirchin - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):645-647.
    Football: the Philosophy behind the Game. By MUMFORD STEPHEN.
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  25.  4
    Revisiting the Epistemic Regress of Dispositions.Daniel Kodaj - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):625-632.
    Pandispositionalists have not refuted the charge that their ideology precludes knowledge of the external world. Their replies boil down to the claim that some dispositions can be detected without the mediation of their effects. But this reply is ineffective if the regress is restated in terms of mind-independent domains of science.
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  26.  15
    Species Natures: A Critique of Neo-Aristotelian Ethics.Tim Lewens - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):480-501.
    This paper examines the neo-Aristotelian account of species natures as ‘life-forms’, which we owe to Philippa Foot, Michael Thompson and their defenders. I begin by developing two problems for their view: a problem of underdetermination and a problem generated by psychological work on ‘folk essentialism’. I move on to consider their important transcendental argument, which suggests that claims about life-forms are presupposed by all efforts to describe the organic world. In response, I sketch a neo-Kantian projectivist position, which agrees that (...)
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  27.  13
    The Normative Significance of Cognitive Science Reconsidered.Dustin Locke - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):502-523.
    Josh Greene famously argued that his cognitive-scientific results undermine deontological moral theorizing. Greene is wrong about this: at best, his research has revealed that at least some characteristically deontological moral judgments are sensitive to factors that we deem morally irrelevant. This alone is not enough to undermine those judgments. However, cognitive science could someday tell us more: it could tell us that in forming those judgments, we treat certain factors as reasons to believe as we do. If we independently deem (...)
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  28.  2
    Responsibility and Comparative Pride – a Critical Discussion of Morgan-Knapp.Cathy Mason - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):617-624.
    Taking pride in being better than others in some regard is not uncommon. In a recent paper, Christopher Morgan-Knapp argues that such pride is misguided: it ‘presents things as being some way they are not’. I argue that Morgan-Knapp's arguments do not succeed in showing that comparative pride is theoretically mistaken.
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  29.  166
    The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):524-546.
    According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.
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  30.  9
    Review of Emotions, Values and Agency, by Christine Tappolet (Oxford University Press 2016). [REVIEW]Jean Moritz Müller - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):647-650.
    Emotions, Values and Agency. By Tappolet Christine.
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  31.  9
    The Normative and the Evaluative. The Buck-Passing Account of Value.Francesco Orsi - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):652-655.
    The Normative and the Evaluative. The Buck-Passing Account of Value. By Rowland Richard.
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  32.  8
    Our Fate. Essays on God and Free Will.John D. O’Connor - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):650-652.
    Our Fate. Essays on God and Free Will. By Martin Fischer John.
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  33.  1
    The Oedipus Plays of Sophocles.Jon Phelan - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):655-657.
    The Oedipus Plays of Sophocles. Edited By Woodruff Paul.
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  34.  22
    Moral Error Theory Without Epistemic Error Theory: Scepticism About Second-Personal Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):547-569.
    Proponents of the epistemic companions in guilt argument argue that we should reject the moral error theory because it entails that there are no epistemic reasons. In this paper, I investigate whether a plausible version of the moral error theory can be constructed that does not entail an error theory about epistemic reasons. I argue that there are no irreducibly normative second-personal reasons even if there are irreducibly normative reasons. And epistemic reasons are not second-personal reasons. In this case, a (...)
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  35.  14
    The Metaphysics of Action: Trying, Doing, Causing.Constantine Sandis - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):657-660.
    The Metaphysics of Action: Trying, Doing, Causing. By Ruben David-Hillel., ISBN 9783319903460.).
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  36.  50
    Sensible Over-Determination.Umrao Sethi - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):588-616.
    I develop a view of perception that does justice to Price's intuition that all sensory experience acquaints us with sensible qualities like colour and shape. Contrary to the received opinion, I argue that we can respect this intuition while insisting that ordinary perception puts us in direct contact with the mind-independent world. In other words, Price's intuition is compatible with naïve realism. Both hallucinations and ordinary perceptions acquaint us with instances of the same kinds of sensible qualities. While the instances (...)
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  37.  73
    The Cosmopolitan Tradition: A Noble but Flawed Ideal.Warren J. von Eschenbach - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):660-663.
    The Cosmopolitan Tradition: A Noble but Flawed Ideal. By Nussbaum Martha C..
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  38.  52
    Acquiring a Concept of Visual Experience.Austin Andrews - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):223-245.
    The transparency of visual experience is a widely held and important thesis in the philosophy of perception. Critical discussion of transparency has focused on visual experiences, such as the experience of visual blur that are taken to be counter examples to transparency. Here, I consider a novel objection to transparency that does not depend on intuitions about examples. The objection is that if transparency is true then we cannot explain our ability to think about our visual experiences as such. In (...)
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  39.  3
    Hegel and Empire: From Postcolonialism to Globalism.Garry Bertholf - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):424-426.
    Hegel and Empire: From Postcolonialism to Globalism. By Habib M.A.R.
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  40.  120
    Negation, Expressivism, and Intentionality.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):246-267.
    Many think that expressivists have a special problem with negation. I disagree. For if there is a problem with negation, I argue, it is a problem shared by those who accept some plausible claims about the nature of intentionality. Whether there is any special problem for expressivists turns, I will argue, on whether facts about what truth-conditions beliefs have can explain facts about basic inferential relations among those beliefs. And I will suggest that the answer to this last question is, (...)
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  41.  70
    A Wolf in the City: Tyranny and the Tyrant in Plato's Republic. [REVIEW]Jason W. Carter - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):419-421.
    In this dense, intelligent, but often frustrating work, Cinzia Arruzza argues that Plato's depiction of tyranny and the character of the tyrant in the Republic is best interpreted as, ‘an intervention in a debate concerning the transformed relation between political leaders and demos in Athenian democracy’ (p. 9) in the last decades of the fifth century BCE. Her central claim is that Plato's critique of tyranny in the Republic was aimed at showing that this particular historical form of Athenian democracy, (...)
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  42.  9
    Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason.J. J. Cunningham - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):429-432.
    Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason. By Mantel Susanne..).
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  43.  40
    The Historical Ontology of Art.Rafael De Clercq - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279).
    In this article, I argue that our ontology of art has undergone a major change in the course of modern history. While we currently think of artworks as parts arranged in a certain way, there was a time when artworks were thought of as metaphysically more akin to ordinary artefacts such as tables and chairs; that is, as wholes having replaceable parts. This change in our ontology of art is reflected in our approach to art restoration. But what explains the (...)
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  44.  4
    Why Thomas Reid Matters to the Epistemology of the Social Sciences.Laurent Jaffro & Vinícius França Freitas - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):282-301.
    Little attention has been paid to the fact that Thomas Reid's epistemology applies to ‘political reasoning’ as well as to various operations of the mind. Reid was interested in identifying the ‘first principles’ of political science as he did with other domains of human knowledge. This raises the question of the extent to which the study of human action falls within the competence of ‘common sense’. Our aim is to reconstruct and assess Reid's epistemology of the sciences of social action (...)
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  45.  97
    Why Free Will Is Real. [REVIEW]Anneli Jefferson - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):432-435.
    Why Free Will Is Real. By List Christian.
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  46.  244
    Mathematical and Moral Disagreement.Silvia Jonas - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):302-327.
    The existence of fundamental moral disagreements is a central problem for moral realism and has often been contrasted with an alleged absence of disagreement in mathematics. However, mathematicians do in fact disagree on fundamental questions, for example on which set-theoretic axioms are true, and some philosophers have argued that this increases the plausibility of moral vis-à-vis mathematical realism. I argue that the analogy between mathematical and moral disagreement is not as straightforward as those arguments present it. In particular, I argue (...)
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  47.  6
    Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology. [REVIEW]Jakub Mácha - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):435-437.
    Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology. By Venturinha Nuno.
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  48.  18
    Hume’s Dictum and Metaethics.Victor Moberger - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):328-349.
    This paper explores the metaethical ramifications of a coarse-grained criterion of property identity, sometimes referred to as Hume's dictum. According to Hume's dictum, properties are identical if and only if they are necessarily co-extensive. Assuming the supervenience of the normative on the natural, this criterion threatens the non-naturalist view that there are instantiable normative properties which are distinct from natural properties. In response, non-naturalists typically point to various counterintuitive implications of Hume's dictum. The paper clarifies this strategy and defends it (...)
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  49.  11
    The Possibility of Unity.H. W. Noonan - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):407-409.
    In One Priest argues for the contradictoriness of Unity. The argument is that the unity of complex things is contradictory. It is contradictory that there are complex wholes composed of many parts. But there are. Thus, the explanation of unity has to be a contradictory entity, a gluon, which both is and is not an object. The book then develops and utilises a theory of gluons. The argument for the contradictoriness of Unity is crucial; without it there is no motivation (...)
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  50.  39
    The Logic of Leibniz’s Borrowed Reality Argument.Stephen Puryear - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):350-370.
    Leibniz argues that there must be a fundamental level of simple substances because composites borrow their reality from their constituents and not all reality can be borrowed. I contend that the underlying logic of this ‘borrowed reality argument’ has been misunderstood, particularly the rationale for the key premise that not all reality can be borrowed. Contrary to what has been suggested, the rationale turns neither on the alleged viciousness of an unending regress of reality borrowers nor on the Principle of (...)
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  51.  74
    Desire and Satisfaction.Ashley Shaw - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):371-384.
    Desire satisfaction has not received detailed philosophical examination. Yet intuitive judgments about the satisfaction of desires have been used as data points guiding theories of desire, desire content, and the semantics of ‘desire’. This paper examines desire satisfaction and the standard propositional view of desire. Firstly, I argue that there are several distinct concepts of satisfaction. Secondly, I argue that separating them defuses a difficulty for the standard view in accommodating desires that Derek Parfit described as ‘implicitly conditional on their (...)
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  52.  27
    Practical Shape.Christine Swanton - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):421-423.
    Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. By Jonathan Dancy.
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  53.  30
    Why Special Relativity is a Problem for the A-Theory.Jason Turner - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):385-406.
    Neither special nor general relativity make any use of a notion of absolute simultaneity. Since A-Theories about time do make use of such a notion, it is natural to suspect that relativity and A-Theory are inconsistent. Many authors have argued that they are in fact not inconsistent, and I agree with that diagnosis here. But that doesn’t mean, as these authors seem to think, that A-Theory and relativity are happy bedfellows. I argue that relativity gives us good reason to reject (...)
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  54.  6
    Existential Flourishing: A Phenomenology of the Virtues.Jonathan Webber - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):438-440.
    Existential Flourishing: A Phenomenology of the Virtues. By McMullin Irene.
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  55.  14
    Must I Accept Prosecution for Civil Disobedience?Daniel Weltman - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):410-418.
    Piero Moraro argues that people who engage in civil disobedience do not have a pro tanto reason to accept punishment for breaking the law, although they do have a duty to undergo prosecution. This is because they have a duty to answer for their actions, and the state serves as an agent of the people by calling the lawbreaker to answer via prosecution. I argue that Moraro does not go far enough. Someone who engages in civil disobedience does not even (...)
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  56.  16
    Democracy After Virtue: Toward Pragmatic Confucian Democracy. [REVIEW]Baldwin Wong - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):440-442.
    Democracy after Virtue: Toward Pragmatic Confucian Democracy. Edited by Sungmoon Kim.
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  57.  80
    Beyond Concepts: Unicepts, Language, and Natural Information. [REVIEW]Mikio Akagi - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):199-201.
    Beyond Concepts: Unicepts, Language, and Natural Information. By Millikan Ruth Garrett.
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  58.  17
    From Natural Character to Moral Virtue in Aristotle.Tom Angier - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):201-204.
    From Natural Character to Moral Virtue in Aristotle. By Leunissen Mariska.
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  59.  335
    Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking.Jamin Asay & Sam Baron - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):1-21.
    In this paper we confront a challenge to truthmaker theory that is analogous to the objections raised by deflationists against substantive theories of truth. Several critics of truthmaker theory espouse a ‘deflationary’ attitude about truthmaking, though it has not been clearly presented as such. Our goal is to articulate and then object to the underlying rationale behind deflationary truthmaking. We begin by developing the analogy between deflationary truth and deflationary truthmaking, and then show how the latter can be found in (...)
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  60.  8
    Unity and Plurality. Logic, Philosophy, and Linguistics.Riccardo Baratella - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):204-206.
    Unity and Plurality. Logic, Philosophy, and Linguistics. Edited by Carrara Massimiliano, Arapinis Alexandra, Moltmann Friederike.
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  61.  146
    Revelation and Phenomenal Relations.Antonin Broi - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):22-42.
    Revelation, or the view that the essence of phenomenal properties is presented to us, is as intuitively attractive as it is controversial. It is notably at the core of defences of anti-physicalism. I propose in this paper a new argument against Revelation. It is usually accepted that low-level sensory phenomenal properties, like phenomenal red, loudness or brightness, stand in relation of similarity and quantity. Furthermore, these similarity and quantitative relations are taken to be internal, that is, to be fixed by (...)
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  62.  60
    Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW]Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):207-209.
    Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility. By Mele Alfred R..).
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  63.  102
    No Theory-Free Lunches in Well-Being Policy.Gil Hersch - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):43-64.
    Generating an account that can sidestep the disagreement among substantive theories of well-being, while at the same time still providing useful guidance for well-being public policy, would be a significant achievement. Unfortunately, the various attempts to remain agnostic regarding what constitutes well-being fail to either be an account of well-being, provide useful guidance for well-being policy, or avoid relying on a substantive well-being theory. There are no theory-free lunches in well-being policy. Instead, I propose an intermediate account, according to which (...)
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  64.  113
    Humean Laws and (Nested) Counterfactuals.Christian Loew & Siegfried Jaag - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):93-113.
    Humean reductionism about laws of nature is the view that the laws reduce to the total distribution of non-modal or categorical properties in spacetime. A worry about Humean reductionism is that it cannot motivate the characteristic modal resilience of laws under counterfactual suppositions and that it thus generates wrong verdicts about certain nested counterfactuals. In this paper, we defend Humean reductionism by motivating an account of the modal resilience of Humean laws that gets nested counterfactuals right.
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  65.  31
    On Parfit’s Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle.Michal Masny - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):114-139.
    In the posthumously published ‘Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles’, Derek Parfit presents a novel axiological principle which he calls the Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle and claims that it does not imply the Repugnant Conclusion. This paper shows that even the best version of Parfit's principle cannot avoid this conclusion. That said, accepting such a principle makes embracing the Repugnant Conclusion more justifiable. This paper further addresses important questions which Parfit left unanswered concerning: the relative importance of individual (...)
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  66.  12
    Things: In Touch with the Past.Derek Matravers - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):212-215.
    Things: In Touch with the Past. By Korsmeyer Carolyn.
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  67.  10
    Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception & Consciousness. [REVIEW]Giovanni Merlo - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):216-218.
    Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception & Consciousness. Edited By Coates Paul, Coleman Sam.. Price £76.00.).
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  68.  310
    Review of The Ethics of Giving: Philosophers’ Perspectives on Philanthropy. [REVIEW]Theron Pummer - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):426-429.
    The Ethics of Giving: Philosophers’ Perspectives on Philanthropy. Edited by Woodruff Paul.
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  69.  31
    Moral Error Theory.Richard Rowland - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):218-220.
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  70.  28
    What is Global Expressivism?Matthew Simpson - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):140-161.
    Global expressivism is the radical view that we should never think of any of our language and thought as representing the world. While interesting, global expressivism has not yet been clearly formulated, and its defenders often use unexplained terms of art to characterise their view. I fix this problem by carefully and clearly exploring the different ways in which we can interpret globalism. I reject almost all of them either because they are implausible or because they are bad interpretations of (...)
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  71.  215
    Non-Normative Logical Pluralism and the Revenge of the Normativity Objection.Erik Stei - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):162–177.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Most logical pluralists think that logic is normative in the sense that you make a mistake if you accept the premisses of a valid argument but reject its conclusion. Some authors have argued that this combination is self-undermining: Suppose that L1 and L2 are correct logics that coincide except for the argument from Γ to φ, which is valid in L1 but invalid in L2. If you accept (...)
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  72.  25
    Why It Does Not Matter What Matters: Relation R, Personal Identity, and Moral Theory.Bastian Steuwer - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):178-198.
    Derek Parfit famously argued that personal identity is not what matters for prudential concern about the future. Instead, he argues what matters is Relation R, a combination of psychological connectedness and continuity with any cause. This revisionary conclusion, Parfit argued, has profound implications for moral theory. It should lead us, among other things, to deny the importance of the separateness of persons as an important fact of morality. Instead, we should adopt impersonal consequentialism. In this paper, I argue that Parfit (...)
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  73.  25
    Wittgenstein: Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1933. From the Notes of G. E. Moore.Nuno Venturinha - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):220-222.
    Wittgenstein: Lectures, Cambridge 1930–1933. From the Notes of G. E. Moore. Edited by Stern David G., Rogers Brian, Citron Gabriel.
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