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. 2017;130(2):759-777.
doi: 10.1007/s11205-015-1204-2. Epub 2016 Feb 17.

De Facto Versus de Jure Political Institutions in the Long-Run: A Multivariate Analysis, 1820-2000

Peter Foldvari  1   2
Affiliations

De Facto Versus de Jure Political Institutions in the Long-Run: A Multivariate Analysis, 1820-2000

Peter Foldvari. Soc Indic Res. 2017.

Abstract

In this paper we use the components of the PolityIV project's polity2 and Vanhanen's Index of Democracy indicators to analyse the relationship between de jure and de facto political institutions from 1820 until 2000 with a canonical correlation method corrected for the sample selection bias. We find considerable fluctuation in the relationship between the two measures. After a moderate positive correlation found during the first half of the nineteenth century, the two measures become statistically unrelated until the 1940s. The relationship becomes strong and positive only in the second half of the twentieth century. The relationship between de jure and de facto political institutions hence can be described as a U-curve, reminiscent to an inverse Kuznets-curve.

Keywords: Canonical correlation; De facto and de jure institutions; Democratization; Polity IV; Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy.

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Conflict of interest statement

The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.

Figures

Fig. 1
Fig. 1
World average scores in different measures of the degree of democracy of political institutions, 1820–2010, Polity2 score of the Polity IV project (−10/+10) and the index of democracy (%). Sources the polity IV dataset by Marshall et al. (2012) and the polyarchy data by Vanhanen (2000, 2003)
Fig. 2
Fig. 2
The polity2 and ID scores for the US and the UK, 1810–2010, Polity2 score of the Polity IV project (−10/+10) and the index of democracy (%). Sources the polity IV dataset by Marshall et al. (2012) and the polyarchy data by Vanhanen (2000, 2003)
Fig. 3
Fig. 3
The theoretical outline of the canonical correlation model (the measurement error terms are omitted for simplicity)
Fig. 4
Fig. 4
Estimated canonical correlation coefficients per year 1820–2000
Fig. 5
Fig. 5
The first canonical correlation coefficient (without correction for sample selection)
Fig. 6
Fig. 6
The first canonical correlation coefficient (with correction for sample selection)
Fig. 7
Fig. 7
Filtered canonical correlation coefficients (HP filter with λ = 100)
See this image and copyright information in PMC

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